The central concept of this article, 'work teams and control', must be understood and developed for a clear comprehension of the issues discussed in the upcoming pages. There are multiple issues considered under the broad heading of 'control'. Work teams provide management with the potential to utilize peer surveillance as a form of controlling the actions of employees (Sewell, 1998; Willmott, 1993) . However, work teams might also provide employees with a greater opportunity to control the processes of work, therefore having a potentially humanizing experience on the nature of work (Mueller, 1994; van den Broek et al., forthcoming) . While these two aspects of control are not mutually exclusive, the 'frontier of control' can be fluid and is primarily determined on the basis of managerial strategy in conjunction with issues such as product markets and labour markets.
Researchers present a spectrum of control regimes that have been the subject of much debate: from providing employees with greater levels of freedom through the notion of responsible autonomy (Friedmann, 1977) , through to management developing panoptic regimes of control (see, for example, Sewell, 1998) . Importantly, the interests of management and employees can have some degree of congruency, hence employees may not always view control in a negative manner (Burawoy, 1979; Rosenthal, 2002; Valsecchi, 2006) . This article considers the two areas of control in the workplace mentioned earlier. First, whether teams are instituted to provide employees with a greater level of control and autonomy over decision-making and the tasks that they are performing in the workplace; and second, whether teams are used as a means of peer surveillance to develop a level of normative control over the actions of employees in the workplace.
This article supports the argument that teams can provide management with a range of possible outcomes, for example, peer control, labour output gains, improved social relations. These outcomes are not mutually exclusive and can include both an increased level of peer surveillance and increased levels of employee control over the labour process. It has been established elsewhere that employees have different reactions to the experience of working in teams (Knights and McCabe, 2000; McCabe, 2000) . This article demonstrates that within these two case study organizations, one team stands apart from the others. This is due primarily to the processes in which this atypical team is engaged. The different processes result in the atypical team having greater level of control over its members' primary processes and, in addition, greater control over what they do when the employees are not engaged in their primary task.
This article is divided into three key sections. The first section introduces the two case study organizations and outlines the study's methodology. This is followed by a consideration of control as a means to devolve decision-making control to the team members. The third section of this article considers teams as a means of peer surveillance in the two case study organizations. Finally, a discussion integrates the findings for an understanding of how control is manifest in these two organizations that are based around work teams.
The Organizations
This research compares two different organizations, a governmentowned call centre (CallsCentral) and a food processing plant (FoodsCo). While employees face diverse working conditions, there are similarities. Each organization is a subsidiary or standalone department of a large Australian organization. At the time of research, each of the organizations was a new work site. Each organization has approximately 150 staff and organizes the employees into work teams. Within the work teams, each organization presents a different, or atypical team within the work sites. It is on the basis of these points that the work sites are compared.
At CallsCentral, three teams were studied. The first team, the Loss of Supply Team (LOST), were a specialized team that were not on the general call queue; rather, they were only taking calls from customers who had lost electrical supply. The other two teams were on the general call queue. At FoodsCo, four teams were studied. Two teams worked in the cooking section of the plant, where employees operated individual work stations preparing the food. The other two teams operated in the 'hell-pit', so named for the red floors and walls, the red caps the workers must wear and the monotonous work processes. In the hell-pit, the employees were divided along two assembly lines, each line combining the ingredients of the cooked meals into single-serving packages.
This article is based around research that was performed throughout 2003 and 2004. It was an ethnographic project that included approximately eight months of participant and non-participant observation. The focus of this time was with the three teams within the call centre and four teams within the food processing plant. Hence, slightly fewer than half of the employees at each work site provided the majority of data for this research. In addition, 31 interviews were undertaken with managers, team leaders, HR representatives and union officials. However, as the issues covered were broader than detailed in this article, a lot of the data come from the observation aspect of data collection. While no team members were 'interviewed' as such, throughout the eight months of ethnographic research we amassed vast amounts of notes of detailed conversations inside and outside the workplace. Conversations and observations were incorporated into the quantitative data analysis programme N-Vivo to assist in the data analysis process. The obvious flaw of the inability to generalize from this research is compensated for by the richness of data collected through the ethnographic research method.
Control and Decision-Making
Central to the suggestion that teams have a positive impact on organizations is the devolution of decision-making. That is to say, in contrast to Taylor's (1911) notion of separating the planning and execution of tasks, employees are 'empowered' with the ability to make process and planning decisions within the team. Thompson and Wallace (1996) refer to teams having a degree of control over governance, technical and normative aspects of the work. Governance issues refer to the extent of delegated powers over the distribution of work, allocation of team members, the selection and function of team leaders; technical issues include delegated responsibilities for resourcing, scheduling and discipline, expanded competencies and continuous improvement processes; and normative issues focus on the changes of attitudes and behaviour necessary to make teamworking operate effectively.
While we understand the notion of sociotechnical team structures from the work of Trist and Bamforth (1951) , many of these lessons of work organization appear to have been lost in the workplace (van Hootegem et al., 2005) . Our current understanding of teams means that they 'emerge in different forms, in different places, and at different times' (Proctor and Mueller, 2000: 12) . These 'differences' mean employees are provided with a range of responsibilities (Doorewaard et al., 2003) . While comparisons to previous research on teamworking are useful, this research considers teams in line with van den Broek et al.'s (2004) suggestion that it is possible to have teams in the workplace without high levels of teamwork.
CallsCentral
As at other call centres (Bain and Taylor, 2002) , workers at CallsCentral have clear call targets they are expected to meet. Talk times that average between 108 and 126 seconds and a 90-second post-call wrap period in which follow-up clerical work is completed are among the targets employees must meet. Unlike many jobs in manufacturing industries, and indeed the FoodsCo processes, the various facets of completing a job with a client cannot be arranged in a neat, linear fashion. Customer service representatives (CSRs) have a limited ability to determine the pace of their work. With the associated pressures of call monitoring, the CSRs do not have the ability to work harder in some periods of the day to 'goldbrick' or to save work and 'ease off ' at other times of the day (Russell, 2004) .
The determination of team member workloads is achieved through the analysis of historical organizational data. The information management system chronicles a wealth of data including total number of incoming calls, total number of actual calls answered, average talk time (ATT) and average handling time (AHT) (including clerical requirements). This system is used to determine the number of employees that are required to be answering calls at any given point of any given day. The key to rostering is balancing the number of CSRs required to meet service levels, while limiting downtime for employees. In this respect, it has been acknowledged that teams within call centres resemble manufacturing industry lean production teams (Mulholland, 2002) .
Importantly, unlike the notion of teams presented as a means to humanize work and increase levels of job enrichment (Mueller, 1994) , the teams at CallsCentral have no input into determining the volume of work to be performed or the time in which that work can be performed. The teams at CallsCentral have limited interaction due to the nature of the tasks, 1 the structure of work spaces and the managerial approach that is commonly found in 626 Economic and Industrial Democracy 28 (4) commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
call centres. This managerial approach includes using the information systems as the key determinant of rostering and, therefore, the workload of employees (Menzies, 1996; Russell, 2002; Taylor, 1998) . Fisher (2004) and Bain and Taylor (2002) present research about the role of trade unions in protecting the workload and skills of call centre members. In this case study, the role of the trade union was not actively involved in workload concerns; rather, the union was focused on wages, disciplinary disputes and safety issues. It seems that the teams at CallsCentral provide employees with no control over governance issues, as management or the technology shape these decisions. Management invests significant resources into developing a normative culture where the customer focus becomes a control measure within itself (Frenkel et al., 1998; Korczynski, 2001) . The teams at CallsCentral are primarily groups of 20 employees consisting of one team leader, one 'senior' 2 (or assistant team leader) and 18 team members (contact centre manager, 23 February 2003) . The organization of the teams is based on the available physical space in the work area. To illustrate this point, formerly when the call centre employed fewer people, the teams consisted of 10 people (with one team leader for every nine employees) (contact centre manager, 23 February 2003). Each team was allocated a work area with 10 fully functional work stations. When the number of employees increased, management made the decision to promote some team members to be 'seniors' rather than team leaders, 3 and each team effectively spanned two of the previous work areas (contact centre manager, 23 February 2003) . Clearly, the size of the team has little to do with functionality, rather the team provides management with a spatial form of control. That is to say, the team members are 'corralled' into the same work area, although this does not result directly in higher levels of intrateam interactions.
In essence, the teams at CallsCentral provide management with a number of aspects of control in the workplace. The teams provide an alternative to the typical hierarchy associated with bureaucratic control (Edwards, 1979) , while still allowing enough hierarchical levels to enable a manageable degree of supervisor direction (or, as it is often referred to in call centres, 'coaching'). The relatively small teams 4 provide a greater opportunity to capture the illusion of surveillance so important to the panopticon debate (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998; Sewell, 1998) . Employees commonly state that they are aware that their team leader has a computer monitor indicating exactly what the CSR may be doing (for example, on a call, post-call wrap or not available for calls). Many employees within the teams indicated that this knowledge means they are less likely to attempt to engage in activities of resistance. While it is unlikely that the employees are aware of the theoretical debates, the notion of panoptic control is a reality that influences their daily activities in the workplace. However, not all employees are mesmerized by the panoptic surveillance.
One of the clear points differentiating teams is the level of decision-making that is concentrated within the team (Mueller, 1994; Thompson and Wallace, 1996) . At CallsCentral, decisionmaking is removed from the discretion of the CSR and embedded within the scripted calls with limited alternatives available for the employees. In essence, management are not giving up any control to the employees in the general call queue whatsoever. However, the Loss of Supply Team is considerably different. In fact, a number of years prior to this research project the LOST employees had submitted a proposal to the call centre manager to become an autonomous team (contact centre manager, 23 February 2003; discussions with LOST members, various dates), that is, a team without a managerially imposed team leader. It is the view of the LOST that as they work for eight hours a day without a team leader present, they are largely unmanaged anyway. 5 As one LOST CSR suggests:
We've told them a few times we should be self-managing and they've always said no but given no reasons. But it's just control. They want someone to watch us. . . . We [are] not 16 years old for God's sake, we can make decisions that have been thought through and are reasonable. (29 April 2003) Some of the additional governance issues proffered to the LOST include the absence of scripting; the ability to turn off the call centre's propaganda radio broadcast after normal operating hours; 6 and a large ability to determine how they spend their time between calls. One consequence of the LOST's increased level of autonomy during off-task time is that the call centre developed a culture where the LOST were viewed as being a team with elite levels of skill who receive special treatment from management. As a result, the LOST provides management with many additional challenges, such as the refusal to cooperate with team leaders and coordinating sick days.
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Economic and Industrial Democracy 28 (4) Consistent with call centres throughout the world (Bain and Taylor, 2000; Taylor and Bain, 1999; van den Broek, 2002) , team members within the general call queue have their starting times, finishing times and all breaks determined on the basis of statistics. However, team members rarely have the same starting, finishing or break times; rather, they are staggered. The rostering and planning officer uses historical data to determine the most appropriate times for employees to take their breaks, and strict adherence to these scheduled breaks is demanded. Indeed, 'compliance' to the roster is an important factor in determining an employee's performance bonus. If an employee takes a call two minutes before a scheduled break and servicing the customer means that the employee is late for the start of his or her break, they must complete a 'segment'. 7 In comparison, the LOST has the flexibility to take their breaks whenever they like, an aspect of their working day that they all recognize and cherish. Indeed, many of the general queue CSRs suggest that they do find the imposed meal breaks frustrating:
It makes me feel like a child at primary school, you know? Wait until you're told it's morning tea time, and no need to think about anything at all. It's things like not being able to just get up and go to the toilet whenever you like, or just take a couple of minutes to catch your breath when things are getting hectic. It's like an inability to control your own actions because you're always at the mercy of the team leader and planning officer. (17 June 2003) Regardless of the rhetoric associated with the presence of teams in the workplace, the responses of many CallsCentral employees recall the mass production workers of yesteryear (see Roy, 1952; Burawoy, 1979) .
By and large, the main benefit of the team structure for the management of the CallsCentral call centre is that of organizing and controlling the actions of the employees. Control over employees is often achieved through attention to establishing a level of normative or cultural control over the workforce (Barley and Kunda, 1992; Korczynski, 2001) . By utilizing the team leaders as the agents of 'fun' in the workplace, management are able to create an environment where the tedium that many researchers (Knights and McCabe, 1998; Korczynski, 2001; Russell, 2002; van den Broek, 2002) associate with call centre work is replaced with the acceptance that the call centre is a 'fun' place to work. At CallsCentral, the phrase 'if it has to be done, then it has to be fun' was introduced by the management team. Employees continually referred to this adage in explaining what they like about working at CallsCentral. As previous studies have recognized (e.g. Kinnie et al., 2000; Russell, 2002) , by making the 'team' the locus of 'fun', management have established a form of control that internalizes employee commitment to their team and their work. The goal for management is to promote commitment while limiting resistance to the more harsh, tedious aspects of the call centre environment described by the aforementioned scholars. However, as is discussed throughout this article, managerial aims did not always transform into actual outcomes in the workplace. Furthermore, on the other hand, employees were able to use humour to undermine the pressures they felt from managerial authority, customer pressures and technology (Taylor and Bain, 2003; van den Broek et al., forthcoming) .
Based on the framework offered by Thompson and Wallace (1996) , the general queue teams at CallsCentral are provided with little control in terms of technical and governance dimensions of teamworking. However, the team structure is an attempt at controlling (or at the very least, influencing) the behaviours of the employees, that is, the normative dimension of teamworking. It can be expected that friendships with team members play a part in the normative dimension of teams. Indeed, many people at CallsCentral appreciate and become quite involved in this development.
This view from employees has important implications for the empowerment vs control debate on teams. It is typically suggested that having an increased level of control over the selection and performance of tasks is essential in teams as a means to 'humanize' the work. However, this is not necessarily the case. As much of postSecond World War industrial sociology recognized (see, for example, Cunnison, 1966; Lupton, 1963) , the work of people is influenced by more than simply the process in which they are engaged. Informal social networks can often provide employees with an outlet from their work. Similar to the formalization of the informal work group, the call centre management are formalizing social interactions through game playing, theme days and interaction in decorating the work space. What is important here is similar to the notion of controlled autonomy (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999) : the management formalize the expectations and allow the employees 630 Economic and Industrial Democracy 28 (4) commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
a range of acceptable, constrained choices in which they have some autonomy. As has been recognized elsewhere (e.g. Benders and van Hootegem, 1999; Thompson and Wallace, 1996) , context plays an important role in researching teams. In the context of the CallsCentral call centre, the CSRs have little control over the selection and execution of tasks. Yet, the working lives of employees are improved through a level of control over their surroundings. This is further support for the call for researchers to move beyond existing paradigms (Benders and van Hootegem, 1999) and incorporate contextual factors to explain the employee's increased levels of satisfaction when there is low control over decision-making over the work processes. The next part of this article considers the issue of control and decisionmaking at the FoodsCo organization. Similarly to CallsCentral, FoodsCo management places a great deal of importance upon issues of 'fun' and the 'team' in an attempt to develop a normative control within the teams.
FoodsCo
Unlike the total process performed in the call centre, employees at FoodsCo are only involved in part of the complete process of assembling a meal. That is to say, depending on an employee's station they may face one of many small tasks. Some examples of the small tasks include: feeding the uncooked food through the cookers; catching and refrigerating the prepared food; placing one portion of the meal (e.g. a fishcake) into single-serving containers; or taking the frozen meals and storing them for dispatch. There is a long line of industrial sociology literature that informs us of the alienating factors of such monotonous work processes (see, for example, Beynon, 1973; Blauner, 1964; Lupton, 1963) . Acknowledging the monotonous work processes, the management of FoodsCo determined that a more active approach would be required to stimulate and maintain job satisfaction and, as a result, high levels of commitment to the organization (management team member, 16 July 2003). Part of this approach was to provide the teams with a high level of responsibility in determining their tasks and minor strategic decisions within the organization (production manager, 17 January 2003; research and development manager, 17 January 2003).
The structure of the FoodsCo organization was to be nonhierarchical, with input and decision-making to come from all employees within the organization (production manager, 17 January 2003). As such, the teams would appear to resemble the sociotechnical team structure encountered in the seminal works of Trist and Bamforth (1951) and further developed in Scandinavian countries (Beggren, 1992) . Teams at FoodsCo would have a great deal of control over determining things like the timing of meal breaks; programming (the order in which work would be completed); problem solving; recruitment; and to an extent, which team members perform which tasks. The teams at FoodsCo could be viewed within the Thompson and Wallace (1996) framework as an attempt to reintegrate the technical aspects of teamworking, that is, integrating the team into the systems of the organization; allowing employees heightened levels of control, or the governance dimension of teamworking; along with promoting changes in attitudes and behaviours, the normative dimension of teams.
However, coupled with other aspects of the FoodsCo production process, it must be acknowledged that the system held many similarities to the lean production system defined by Womack et al. (1990) . Lean production is based on the principles of communication, efficient use of resources, elimination of waste and teamwork (Womack et al., 1990) . However, critics of teamworking programmes argue that they lead to an increased level of managerial control and work intensification (Barker, 1993; Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Parker and Slaughter, 1988) . Soon after the beginning of production at FoodsCo, the two production managers recognized that they were facing too great a workload to fully develop the skills of the employees (production manager, 3 June 2003). In fact, the workload was such that one production manager sought opportunities elsewhere, leading to a reconsideration of the organization's structure (production manager, 3 June 2003), and importantly for this case study, a reorganization of the structure of the teams within FoodsCo. When the production manager did resign, rather than hiring an equivalent replacement, four team leaders 8 were employed to assist the remaining production manager (production manager, 17 January 2003).
As the remaining production manager suggests:
obsolete and they take up other project work [within the parent company]. We are only half way down the road to self-managed teams and part of the team leader's job is to educate the staff as to how they make the decisions they need to make. (2 July 2003)
It was widely acknowledged by both management and operators that the high workload was an indication that management 'weren't sharing the learning well' (production manager, 3 June 2003). In other words, production demands were interfering with employee training and development and the maintenance of the organizational culture. There was little opportunity in this case for union involvement because the managers aimed for successful team development as a measure of success and employees joining the union would be seen as a failure. As such, a very active union-avoidance stance was present and the union's efforts at gaining access focused on the issue of low levels of pay rather than workload and control concerns. For the employees who supported the union, rates of pay was 'the' issue that could foster greater levels of commitment to the union.
Teams without 'freedoms and responsibilities' have been noted as a common reason for team-based work to fail (West and Markiewicz, 2003; Vallas, 2003) . Furthermore, Basler and Breslin (1991, cited in Mueller, 1994) state that inexperience of working in teams is a common problem for organizations that shift to semiautonomous work teams (SAWTs). A failure on the part of the management in their study to provide adequate team skills training meant a substantial practical change. The insertion of another level within the hierarchy confirms the shift of the teams from the intended structure of SAWTs, closer to those described as lean teams where many of the responsibilities that had been devolved to teams lay in the hands of team leaders. Importantly for this case study, the initial intentions of management could not be realized and the unintended outcomes were significant for the organization. The determination of production schedules was kept in the hands of management; however, it is widely acknowledged by operators and manager alike that schedules must be fluid to react to the common problems associated with JIT (just-in-time) production. The main problems occur when the 'perfect symmetry between supply and demand' (Delbridge et al., 1992) fails and products may not arrive when expected.
Traditionally, teamworking is focused at lower levels of the organization, involving workers undertaking day-to-day aspects of their work (Marchington, 2000) . That is to suggest that strategic organizational decisions are rarely, if ever, under the purview of work teams. At FoodsCo, where the structure of the teams changed, one unintended outcome was that the level of day-to-day control over decision-making for employees was limited. Hence, management viewed the maintenance of a level of employee involvement as vital in developing the expected corporate culture. As such, the 'culture' that sought 'self-responsibility' and 'open and honest communication' (research and development team member, 12 January 2003) among employees would also rely upon managers foregoing some decisions that would traditionally be seen as managerial prerogative. Indeed, passing some decision-making into the hands of the employees is something that managers found somewhat difficult.
One of the first significant transfers of decision-making was in the lead-up to the Easter holidays in April 2003. In Australia, many organizations close down for the four days of Easter, from Good Friday through to Easter Monday. The FoodsCo leadership team offered the workforce the opportunity to vote about whether the site would be closed for the remainder of the week following Easter. A 'yes' vote would mean an additional four days of unpaid leave, 9 but a total of 10 days' break altogether. A majority 'no' vote would mean that production would continue and the plant would only have the four days of Easter shutdown. The result of the vote was as follows:
YES -69% NO -6% DID NOT VOTE -25%
While the vast majority of employees indicated that they were happy with having a say on the shutdown, there were a few sceptical employees. Given that one-quarter of the employees chose not to vote at all, this scepticism should not be ignored. What this level of voting abstinence tells us is that while the intention of employee involvement initiatives may be well placed (Marchington, 1992) , employees may not necessarily want, appreciate or accept being involved in decision-making. Or worse, such arrangements may actually uncover an underlying distrust of management. For example, operators offer the following vignettes explaining why they did not vote in the Easter decision: I guess it's alright, but it's not a big deal is it? They make it out to be, but if they don't like the way we vote they just won't let us vote next year. (9 April 2003) Perhaps unsurprisingly, the leadership team found giving up such decision-making prerogatives quite a challenge, and they were indeed troubled by the fact that employees might not vote the way the management would like (production manager, 9 April 2003). Nevertheless, management viewed the voting process as important as it contributed to repairing the failing development of the governance dimension of teams and employee decision-making in the organization. The following section of this article considers the other aspect of control in this study: teams as a means of implementing or increasing peer control in the workplace.
Teams as Peer Control
It is argued by some (see, for example, Barker, 1993; Sewell, 1998; Willmott, 1993 ) that teams promote a coercive element that leads to, at the very least, work intensification. The key to this argument is the notion that placing employees into teams leads to peer surveillance. That is to say, employees are implicitly and explicitly expected to adopt the traditional responsibility of management in supervising their fellow workers. Participants in van den Broek's study provide fabulous examples of team members enforcing the rules of the workplace in lieu of management:
. . . an employee was playing a computer game instead of receiving customer calls when another employee, who noticed that he was not taking calls made a 'joke' that they could both play the game. The attention generated from other workers was enough to encourage this person to resume taking calls. (van den Broek, 1997: 347) Edwards (1979) identified what he referred to as simple control. If the argument of team structures providing a coercive peer pressure is true, then the team effectively is a shift of simple control from the hands of the supervisor directly, to the manager by proxy of every single member of the work team.
Peer Control at CallsCentral
When employees at CallsCentral spoke of their team, most commonly it was in phraseology that indicated acceptance of the team structure in a highly individualized environment. For example: 'It's not really teamwork as such, just more like looking after your mates ' (22 April 2003) . This is reflective of research presented by van den Broek et al. (2004) , who argued that there is a distinct and discernible difference between 'teams' and 'teamwork'. By and large, employees within the general call queue teams are not cognisant of their ability to directly influence the work of their fellow team members, nor of their team members directly influencing their own work. Rather, it is simply 'the right thing to do. You just do your job to the best of your ability' (1 April 2003). Herein lies the paradox of employees' acceptance of the team. Employees recognize the rather individualized nature of their work, and recognize the inability on a day-to-day basis to work with their team members in anything more than a very superficial manner. However, the majority of the employees appear to have 'bought into' the rhetoric of teams in the workplace.
Certainly, the manufactured fun in the workplace is intended to develop an environment where employees are thinking beyond themselves and their work station and about the other employees in the team. While this research was being undertaken, the call centre management developed a competition referred to as the 'PowerGames'. Measures taken for an individual CSR's key performance indicators (KPIs), such as the number of sales, call times (AHT, ATT) and the adherence to rosters are used to award the teams scores. These scores are tallied and the rankings, along with individual 'star performers', are displayed on the large, colourful noticeboard outside the lift at the main entrance to the call centre. High performing employees would earn recognition among peers, as well as prizes such as overnight stays in upmarket city hotels. Team members of the winning team receive the obvious 'glory' associated with being a member of the champion team as well as prizes such as cinema tickets and shopping vouchers. CSRs indicate a level of enjoyment in the 'games'; however, at the same time, recognize the coercive nature of discreetly manipulated work intensification:
. . . [working hard to reach call targets and increase sales] really puts some pressure on you, you know. I can't let the team down, but on the other side it's nice to know you're helping out the team. (2 July 2003) Employees at the call centre are rewarded performance bonuses based in part (50 percent) on reaching performance indicators, such as ATT and AHT (training and development team leader, 21 February 2003). The performance bonus is compared to the average performance throughout the call centre. For example, when an employee's ATT is compared to the floor average, if the statistics are higher than 110 percent of the floor average the employee is awarded the lowest rating of '1', which indicates the CSR 'needs improvement' in this area. Between 90 percent and 110 percent of the floor average is rated as a '2' and 'meets expectations', while between 75 and 89 percent of floor average is rated the highest level of '3' and 'exceeds expectations' (call centre documentation, obtained 17 June 2003).
The other 50 percent of the performance bonus relates to subjective measures observed by the team leader. Every month, call centre employees are asked to determine, with the 'support' of their team leader, a WISH list. What do I do Well; Where can I Improve; What Strategies am I going to use; and How am I going to achieve my goals? As a contribution to the performance bonus, the team leader makes a subjective evaluation of the CSR's performance in meeting the set goals. Examples of commonly stated goals are: improve sales figures; improve compliance; increase knowledge of products; reduce talk time, etc. The team leader's evaluations remain subjective as there are not explicit values placed on the goals. For example, the stated goal may be to 'improve knowledge of products' rather than quantifying how the improvement is measured and what level of improvement is expected. A number of employees indicate frustrations with this system, particularly those employees who perceive themselves as not being a team leader's 'favourite' team member.
One performance indicator measures the number of sales that a CSR makes throughout the week. Team leaders and employees alike recognize that in the last two years there has been a distinct movement towards a more sales-focused approach to their work.
With pay bonuses attached to employees attaining targets, there is little question that this is intended as financial motivation and an element of maintaining control over the workforce and as a consequence, increasing profitability. However, a handful of employees speak of the frustration associated with being forced to try to make sales to every caller with whom they have contact. According to one CSR:
If I wanted to make sales I'd go and work at Myer. I'm here to answer calls and make sure people have their service connected. I'm not going to do it, I don't care what they say or how much pressure some of the team put on me. (25 March 2003) In sum, the actual team's performance plays no role in the performance bonus of the individuals. So, if there was a level of peer surveillance and coercion associated with the team structure at CallsCentral it is not based in motivating team pay systems. However, employees do speak of the environment where they feel the pressure to conform and achieve to ensure that they 'do not let down the team ' (25 February 2003) . Team leaders suggest that people were indeed working harder for each other: 'We are a team. We work as a team, we fail as a team and we succeed as a team. Hopefully we succeed more often ' (team leader, 14 February 2003) . Clearly, financial benefit is not a reward for peer surveillance, but does peer surveillance really exist? The evidence indicates that it does exist to a degree, however only minimally; and further, the level of peer surveillance appears to be different within different teams. As previously mentioned, the labour process and the structural organization of work stations, at least in part, prevent employees from directly watching over each other to ensure conformity and high levels of performance. However, it is clear that the employees at CallsCentral, like other call centres, are internalizing the normative expectations of working within a team (van den Broek et al., 2004) .
In comparison to the other teams, the nature of the calls that come to the loss of supply queue means that the LOST members have traditionally spent hours of off-task time each week. When there were no calls, the team have previously been allowed to spend their time watching television, playing cards, reading books or talking. One outcome of this has been the development of a very strong commitment to each other as team members. This commitment and the desire to retain this work and team organization is referred to in 638
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this article as having a high level of team cohesion. The term 'cohesion', when relating to teams in this study, is consistent with the definition presented by Yeatts and Hyten (1998) . Cohesion is the degree to which team members feel attracted to their team and are compelled to remain members. When there is a major power outage, the LOST can have scores of calls in the queue with still only two employees operating the phones. At such times, the LOST may perform double shifts (16 hours) before having an eight-hour break and returning to the centre to perform another shift. Woodward (1965) notes that while technology places limits on the work, there are social properties of the organization that are independent of the organization. These employees hold a preferred position, based on the processes as recognized by Blauner (1964) , and use their 'social properties' to influence and develop a high level of team cohesion.
Managerial objectives in the normative sphere are unlikely to be successful if they are solely top-down or not underpinned by strong incentives (van den Broek et al., 2004) . Demonstrating that this team is quite different to others in this workplace, the LOST formulated a level of cohesion that developed to meet their own needs first, followed by those of management. This is an unusual development within a call centre. This cannot be viewed as peer surveillance within the context of the panoptic or chimerical control debate. The individuals within the LOST are using the team to 'influence' their peers in their own interests, rather than providing 'surveillance' in the interests of management.
Throughout a number of years leading up to this research and continuing throughout this research project, the LOST faced a number of managerial strategies that were aimed at 'busting' the cohesive group that had evolved. However, the team faced these attacks in an active and disciplined manner to provide a distinct advantage to the employees, rather than the management. Towards the end of the fieldwork phase of this research project, a rumour began circulating that management had planned changes that would lead to a restructuring of the LOST. The team members deliberated over the fate that awaited them. Some of the most obvious expectations for the LOST were that they would lose a team member to the general queue, or perhaps the remote possibility of the LOST being disbanded and these calls being redirected to the general queue. The team members would sit in their work area and formulate plans to maintain the status quo: One day last week one of the girls was on a break and when she arrived back the other had asked to be put on general queue -talk about doing yourself out of a job. So for a while no one was on loss calls at all. I mean, ridiculous -we can't let her do that, we have to be smart at this point in time or they'll [management] get us. (1 May 2003) Clearly, the LOST members are exerting control over fellow team members -not in the interests of management; rather, in their own interests as a team and as individuals. This organization provides an example of how teams can evolve differently within the same organizational structure or indeed, within the same workplace. This article now turns to the notion of peer surveillance as control in the second case study organization, FoodsCo. This organization demonstrates a similar divergence in the level of peer control displayed among team members, based primarily on the processes in which the teams are engaged.
Peer Control at FoodsCo
With the previously mentioned change in team structure at FoodsCo, there is an increased focus on the normative dimension of the workplace. Management's interpretation of the normative dimension of the team structure would appear to be an attempt to develop and maintain a culture where the employees are committed to the organization and their team mates, have pride in their work and enjoy a relationship with management based on respect and equality. This section considers whether this 'culture' impacts upon the dimensions of peer control. Furthermore, this section considers whether the teams at FoodsCo differ in terms of their ability or inclination to 'control' their peers.
A key difference between the teams at FoodsCo and the teams at CallsCentral is the level of interaction between the employees while working. With the exception of the LOST team at CallsCentral (as previously discussed), CSRs spend a large portion of their time engaged in interactions with clients. However, the immediate absence of the third party (customers) means that the FoodsCo employees do not have the constant external pressure to conform and to engage in a 'professional manner'. Hence, the FoodsCo employees engage in their work processes motivated by their managers, their team members and their individual work ethic.
The expectation of management is that those who progress successfully through the recruitment process will have a positive impact on the organization (HR representative, 12 March 2003) . This is an attempt to capitalize on the potential for peer surveillance: the employees are not just under the 'tutelary eye' of the team (Barker, 1993: 432) ; there is an aim to recruit people who would be more likely to provide a level of peer surveillance in favour of management.
Central to the JIT production system is the elimination of waste in processes, goods and human effort (Womack et al., 1990) . To a certain extent, peer surveillance is necessary for such a regime to survive successfully. In addition, without the employees' willingness to share their tacit knowledge over what is occurring to them and their peers on the shop floor, the process of eliminating waste will be less successful. The use of quality circles and team meetings has traditionally been the avenue for management to gather the tacit knowledge of the shopfloor operators to 'refine' the end-to-end processes in search of value-adding efficiencies.
The management group at FoodsCo made a determined effort to instil in the workforce the acceptance of improving quality and reducing waste as an everyday occurrence, rather than a process that should wait for a team meeting. In essence, the aim is to incorporate quality into everyday team actions, as discussed in previous studies, for example Mallon and Kearney (2001) . Acknowledging the work of Knights and McCabe (Knights and McCabe, 2000; McCabe, 2000) , employees are seen to have different responses to the 'teams' experience. Hence, it could be expected that not all employees are willing to watch over their fellow team members in an attempt to maintain a heightened level of production.
Undeniably, there is a mixed response from operators:
The worst thing about the so-called flat structure is that we could be working flat out, you know, 100 percent and a few people could be slackening off so someone has to pick up the slack. So the choice is either work at 130 percent or tell these guys to get their shit together. So what do you think? How would you like to have to tell people to get moving all the time? It's not good mate. I'm not really interested in giving people a hard time if they slacken off. What benefit is there to me? Sure, maybe they'll work a bit harder, but they'll also be pissed off at me and when you work with these people every day, that's not fun. You have to get on to them. It's just not fair if most of us are slaving away and a couple of people, or one in particular is a lazy whatever. It might make me unpopular sometimes, but it's the right thing to do. We're all in this together and to pretend any different means you're not really a team player and probably don't fit our culture. (3 June 2003) Importantly, by recruiting employees who are willing to adopt the normative dimensions of the organization, management are limiting the opportunities for employees to develop what is described as the worker 'counter pressure' of constantly 'negotiating and renegotiating' the frontier of control (Hyman, 1975: 197) . Although there are many employees who are keen to actively develop the processes that are utilized in an attempt to be an integral part of a successful organization, there are also many employees who make rationalizations about the information that they will share, and the level of peer surveillance they will engage in. These rationalizations are determined by the employees' perceptions of what will be the outcome of sharing that information. A handful of employees indicated that if they were to find any ways of beating the system that would make their life easier then that information would be something they would keep to themselves.
Even within a workplace with a significant focus on the normative aspects of teamworking, it must be acknowledged that employees do not confine themselves to a particular course of action. An employee who may share with fellow team members an idea in improving one process, may indeed be the employee who withholds details about a potential fiddle in another area. In another context, this employee will actively share details with other employees, and form a group bond to keep the information from management.
Interestingly, the comments that indicate a level of resistance to peer surveillance notions and 'giving up' tacit knowledge all come from employees who work in one area, the cooking area. These are the production employees at FoodsCo who have a greater level of control of the labour process. While they can face substantial pressure to reach production targets, they are not obliged to keep up with the machine. In some sense, these employees develop a different notion of what it means to be in a team. The other teams, those employees within the 'hell-pit', see the benefits of the team as recognizing that 'we're all in it together' (9 April 2003), 'although my job is bad, so is everyone else's in here ' (3 June 2003) and that 'everyone needs to do their job for it [the assembly process] to work ' (12 March 2003) .
Many employees in the cooking section see their jobs as largely task specific, that is to say, one person cooks the pasta, one person cooks the chicken on the belt grill and so on. However, if the team members have some time between processes (for example, all the pasta is cooking and there will be 10 minutes before another batch is required), then the expectation is that the employees assist other team members. That is unless there is another activity they choose to do, for example, have an extended meal break, chat with other people or hide in the freezer or toilet as some employees admit to doing occasionally. The point is that this is the only group within the organization that has the luxury of deciding what they will do from one moment to the next, and they savour this freedom. This demonstrates that in this workplace one team is quite different based on the processes that they perform, and this requires management to take a different approach to the employees within this section. This difference has implications for the issue of peer surveillance activities within the teams.
The processes of the assembly teams mean that 20 employees are divided between the workstations of two conveyor belts. The pace of the machine controls the pace of the work the team members must perform. Employees are faced with the decision to leave or conform by keeping pace with the machine. Again, the recruitment process is central in attracting employees that are more likely to conform. This pressure to conform is not as strong in the cooking teams because the processes are based on individualized work stations and the employees' determination to control their pace of work. Not all processes allow employees full control as some tasks are computerized. However, those tasks that are computerized allow the employees large portions of off-task time. This off-task time provides employees with high levels of control over their non-primary tasks. Provided employees are completing their own workload, there is little pressure from their fellow team members.
Discussion
Organizing employees in these new workplaces appears to stem from different practical motivations. The teams at CallsCentral are primarily a function of spatial control with no transfer over governance or technical issues. However, the teams are provided with constrained choices over normative aspects of their team. In comparison, the introduction of teams at FoodsCo is an example of the managerial intention of shifting control to the employees with the integration of technical, governance and normative dimensions (Thompson and Wallace, 1996) of the teams. The outcome would be work teams that would resemble what is commonly referred to as SAWT. However, a lack of adequate training and resources was partially compensated for by a commitment from senior management to maintain a team structure. The introduction of teams into organizations can often be a failed exercise, with low commitment from senior management or a failure to provide sufficient training as commonly cited reasons for such initiatives to fold (Saporito, 1986; Walton, 1985) . The result was a 'different' type of team developed, more in line with the notion of 'lean teams' presented by Womack et al. (1990) and discussed at length by authors such as Delbridge et al. (1992) , Garrahan and Stewart (1992) and Parker and Slaughter (1988) .
As mentioned, control can be viewed as two different but related concepts within the context of this article. Call centres represent the focus of a recent debate on peer surveillance in the workplace. The employees at CallsCentral represent a mixed picture in terms of peer surveillance. Some employees suggest that they feel the pressures to conform and improve their performance for the benefit of the team, while other employees suggest that they resist, or do not feel any pressure in this regard. Furthermore, no performance bonuses are paid based on team performance. If team-based pay systems are used to motivate team performance, surely individualbased pay systems would do nothing to motivate team performance. In an interesting development, the members of the LOST engage in a level of peer influence, differentiated from peer surveillance as the outcome is to the benefit of the team commonly at the expense of managerial goals.
Following the pattern of the general queue CSRs in CallsCentral, there is no distinct pattern of peer surveillance at FoodsCo. Certainly, employees recognize the pressures placed upon them by other employees, or indeed the pressure that employees must place upon others. However, there are numerous employees who reject the notion of coercive pressure from team mates. While these findings both partially support and partially reject the notion of peer surveillance in teams, this is total support for the argument offered by Knights and McCabe (Knights and McCabe, 2000; McCabe, 2000) that employees have different experiences of teams.
The final area of import is the differential between the aspirations of managers in the workplaces and the actual outcomes. In each of the cases, managers expected the teams to provide a range of productivity improvements through employee commitment, process efficiencies and so on. Important in securing these goals was the notion that all teams would be 'equal'. However, as previous researchers have found, and this research supports, all teams are not equal. All teams are not 'created' equal, nor do all teams 'evolve' equally.
Conclusion
In this article, control was considered as two separate issues; first, the notion of who controls the decision-making processes within work teams; and second, teams as a means of management controlling the workforce through peer control. CallsCentral has an atypical team with a structure determined by the size of the team and the processes in which this team engage. FoodsCo also provides us with an example of a work site where teams are intended to be the same, employees are intended to be equal, and yet one team has developed into a clearly different structure, based upon the work processes in which these team members engage. This research has examined in detail the manifestation of control in two organizations that are based around work teams. There is little question that teams can provide employees with greater levels of control over governance, technical and normative aspects of the work. However, this is not uniform throughout the teams. Not only are there differences between the workplaces, but within each of the workplaces teams differ. Teams with greater control over decision-making have the potential to improve the working lives of employees but to also develop an increased comparative level of power within the workplace.
Reflecting the work of Knights and McCabe, employees have different experiences within teams. The response to increase pressure to conform to team expectations is different for employees. Consequently, the peer control aspect of the team debate does hold some credibility; however, with the caveat of difference. That is, different teams present different levels of peer control and different employees respond differently.
